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A SHORT NEWS ANNOUNCEMENT READS, "Residents are being asked for
the second time to change zoning laws to allow for a new zone for
two-family dwellings. Officials said they believe the issue was defeated
in November because the language on the ballot was confusing."' This
short newspaper announcement exemplifies the problems for voters of
confusing ballot language-a problem that has plagued elections in
recent years. While the general theory might be that politicians or
special interest groups purposely confuse the issues so that their side
is unwittingly approved by the general public, the truth is that confusing
ballot language has as much chance to thwart decent legislation as it
does to surreptitiously cause an undesirable law to be enacted.2
To that end, there is a problem when a mandatory public referendum
is required to approve what a planning committee, elected by the general
public, has already approved. Although the purpose of mandatory refer-
enda has been to provide a "check" on the powers of such a governmen-
tal entity, this check loses its efficacy when either poor voter turnout
or confusing ballot language thwart what might very well be the desire
of the electorate at large. When that happens, the mandatory referendum
is an unnecessary, costly, and even delaying process.
The concept of the mandatory referendum is often associated with
approving or disapproving a zoning enactment of a particular municipal-
1. Important Issues Face Voters; More than 60 in the Area to be Settled on
Tuesday; One-Third are Nonschool, AKRON BEACON J., May 28, 1992, at B3.
2. See, e.g., Jim East, Sentiments Same for Stadium Vote, THE TENNESSEEAN, May
6, 1996, at IA; Hollace Silbiger, Avon Faces Big Bills from Fees in 3 Lawsuits,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 19, 1994, at 1B; Sue Kiesewetter, Levy Supporters
to Knock on Doors in Mt. Healthy, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 22, 1994.
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ity. The power of zoning has traditionally been a power of local self-
government In order to comport with due process principles, legislative
enactments that allow for zoning generally include provisions that such
legislation be adopted when two conditions have been met: First, when
a detailed study of the regulation and development plans has been
made; and second, when it is apparent any measures so adopted would
coincide with and be conformable to an overall and comprehensive
plan for the municipality.4 These requirements have been enough to
satisfy the criteria necessary to show a zoning ordinance is neither
arbitrary or unreasonable, nor amounts to an unconstitutional taking
of property.'
Within their city charters, municipalities often have referendum pro-
visions. These require the electorate to decide the final fate of a proposed
zoning enactment.6 While referendum power is reserved or granted to
the people of a municipality, courts have been required to decide
whether referendum power has been constitutionally exercised, and
whether such power has been lawfully delegated.
Associated with the power of referendum are competing social and
civic policies. On one hand, it may be in the best interests of the
municipality to allow comprehensive zoning proposals planned by
experts and adopted by elected officials. On the other hand, legislative
action by a select few is against a philosophy of wider public participa-
tion and choice in municipal affairs to be accomplished through a broad
and liberal extension of the referendum power.'
The ultimate question is what is in the best interests of the people.
The Constitution requires any taking of land to comport with principles
of due process.8 If the Supreme Court has determined due process is
3. See generally Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
4. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-52-9 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 11-806 (Michie 1939);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-414, 14-56-505 (Michie 1955); CAL. Gov. CODE § 65850 et
seq. (West 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-131 & § 31-23-207 (1975); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 8-36 (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9 § 2656, § 4956 & § 6956 (1975); IND.
CODE § 36-7-4-504 (1996); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 125.19 & § 125.37 (Law Co-op. 1996);
MINN. STAT. §§ 462.356, 462.357 (1996); Mo. REV. STAT. § 89.350 (1996); OKLA. STAT.
§ 47-107 (1996); 16 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5210 & 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10607 (1997);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-23-500 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11-6-15 (Michie 1996);
TEX. LOCAL Gov'r CODE ANN. § 231.079 (West 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-447
(Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE § 8-24-17 (1996).
5. See generally Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
6. See generally Ronald H. Rosenberg, Referendum Zoning: Legal Doctrine and
Practice, 53 U. CiN. L. REv. 381 (1984).
7. See generally Nicolas M. Kublicki, Land Use by, for, and of the People: Prob-
lems with the Application of Initiatives and Referenda to the Zoning Process, 19 PEPP.
L. REV. 99, 99 (1991).
8. U.S. CONST. Amend V.
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satisfied when a restriction on property bears some "rational relation
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare," 9 then there is
a potential conflict when a referendum conceivably gives voters the
power to arbitrarily prevent their neighbors' chosen use of land after
a planning committee has already decided particular zoning is related
to health, safety, morals, or general welfare. ° Moreover, given the
nature of how zoning issues are presented to the general public, it is
questionable whether mandatory referendum accomplishes anything at
all, except as another layer of bureaucracy.
This article will argue that while mandatory referendum might not
be an unlawful delegation of legislative powers, it might be an unneces-
sary step that actually thwarts zoning legislation. With limited voter
turnouts and the complexity of ballot language on zoning issues, voters
may knowingly or unknowingly regulate a neighbor's property use,
and additionally may knowingly or unknowingly hinder the efforts of
city planners who have painstakingly attempted to regulate land use in
compliance with what would otherwise be regarded as constitutionally
acceptable guidelines. The article argues that the Supreme Court's
conclusion in Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc." that referenda
are constitutional because their results may be challenged, is not a
realistic vision of the zoning process as it now exists. Rather the
Supreme Court's previous standards articulated in Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co. 2 and Moore v. East Cleveland3 should be sufficient to ensure
an efficient process of municipal management without the necessity of
challenging the results of a public referendum.
I. History of Zoning Regulation
Many states have adopted state constitutional provisions that grant
municipalities the authority to exercise powers of local self-government
and to adopt and enforce regulations that are related to the health and
safety of the municipality. These provisions are often referred to as
"Home Rule" Amendments. 4 There have been many areas in which
9. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 392.
10. State of Washington v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
11. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
12. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
13. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
14. See, e.g., Art. XVIII, § 3, of the Ohio Constitution which states, "Municipalities
shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and
enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary, and other similar regulations,
as are not in conflict with general laws."
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citizens have tested the extent of the "Home Rule" power.15 One of
these areas is municipal zoning, and in particular, residential zoning.
Although residential zoning cases have seldom come before the
Supreme Court of the United States, there have been various landmark
cases addressing the issue and its offshoots. In 1926, comprehensive
zoning received near blanket approval in the case of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Company.
16
In Euclid, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
village's comprehensive zoning plan for regulating and restricting such
things as location of trades, industries, apartment houses, family homes,
lot sizes, and the height of village buildings. 7 The plaintiff, who owned
a tract of land which he intended to sell and develop for industrial
use, sought to enjoin the enforcement of the zoning ordinance which
prohibited an industrial use of his land. The ordinance was attacked
on the ground that it was a violation of the Due Process Clause. The
Court, however, found justification for the village's zoning regulations
rooted in the police powers of a municipality. 8 While noting that the
line that separates the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of
powers was not capable of precise delineation, the Court found that if
the validity of a legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly
debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.' 9
The Court then confronted an issue that it had not addressed before-
the validity of an ordinance that created residential districts from which
businesses and trades of every sort were excluded. The Court com-
mented that the matter of zoning had received much attention at the
hands of commissions and experts who concurred that the segregation
of residential, business, and industrial buildings would make it easier
to provide fire apparatus suitable for the character and intensity of the
15. See, e.g., City and County of Denver v. Colorado, 788 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1990)
(challenging residency requirements as unconstitutional); Illinois Gasoline Dealers
Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 491 N.E.2d 112 (111. App. Ct. 1986) (challenging constitution-
ality of gasoline tax); Sioux City Police Officers' Asso'n v. Sioux City, 495 N.W.2d
687 (Iowa 1993) (challenging antinepotism policy as unconstitutional); Koricili v.
DeKalb County, 324 S.E.2d 450 (Ga. 1985) (challenging constitutionality of liquor
licensing); Tops Markets, Inc. v. Erie, 591 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. 1992) (challenging
item pricing law as unconstitutional); City of Rocky River v. State Empl. Rel. Bd.,
530 N.E.2d 1 (Ohio 1988) (challenging constitutionality of binding arbitration clause).
16. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). For a discussion of the constitutional status of state
zoning regulations prior to Euclid, see Robert F. Benintendi, The Role of the Compre-
hensive Plan in Ohio: Moving Away from the Traditional View, 17 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 207 (1991).
17. 272 U.S. at 379-80.
18. Id. at 387.
19. Id. at 388.
SPRING 1997
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development in each section.2" Furthermore, the segregation would
increase the safety and security of home life, greatly tending to prevent
street accidents by reducing traffic and resulting confusion in residential
areas." Summarizing, the Court stated that the policy reasons given
for having segregated residential districts were sufficiently cogent to
prevent the Court from concluding that such provisions were clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Therefore, the ordinance
could not be ruled to be unconstitutional.22
The Supreme Court confirmed its stand on the issue of the constitu-
tionality of zoning regulations in a few decisions following Euclid in the
1920s.23 Nevertheless, since Euclid was decided, the Court essentially
divorced itself from zoning cases for nearly half a century and did not
begin to participate in the growing body of zoning law again until
1970s.24 Upon re-entering the field, it was clear that the Court was
reluctant to alter the established standard. The Court's general rule that
a zoning regulation would be upheld as constitutional unless it had no
substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare reflected its reluctance to enter the zoning area by deferring
to the legislative body. Moreover, in Warth v. Seldin,25 the Court com-
mented that zoning laws and their provisions were peculiarly within
the province of local and state legislative authority and were essential
to effective urban planning. The Court stated that zoning laws were
subject to judicial review in a proper case, but that citizens dissatisfied
with provisions of such laws need not overlook the availability of the
normal democratic process.26
Under that line of reasoning, the Court limited its review of zoning
cases to matters provoking special review. In an era of racial discrimina-
tion, the Court was more concerned with the use of zoning and land
20. Id. at 393.
21. Id. at 394.
22. 272 U.S. at 395.
23. See Goreb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (upholding a zoning regulation because
the regulation was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having substantial relation to
the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the municipality).
24. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of zoning cases, see Quintin
Johnstone, Government Control of Urban Land Use: A Comparative Major Program
Analysis, 39 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 373 (1994).
25. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
26. Ironically, in Warth, the Court held that none of the plaintiffs in the case had
standing to sue because they failed to establish an actionable causal relationship between
the zoning restrictions and the asserted injury. The Court stated that a plaintiff who
sought to challenge exclusionary zoning practice was required to allege concrete facts
demonstrating that the challenged practice harmed him, and that he personally would
benefit from the court's intervention. Id. at 508.
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control as a way to discriminate against minorities. 27 Rather than analyz-
ing cases under the standard enunciated in Euclid, the Court found
ways to strictly scrutinize ordinances that may have been enacted merely
to discriminate. For instance, in Moore v. East Cleveland five members
of the Court agreed that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was violated by a housing ordinance that limited occupancy
of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined
family as only a few categories of related individuals, essentially parents
and their children. Rather than apply the constitutional standard enunci-
ated in Euclid, which would have only required a rational basis for the
ordinance, the Court held that Euclid did not apply because the ordi-
nance was aimed at regulating the family. Instead, the Court commented
that it must apply a stricter standard of review to guarantee that the
State is not intruding on the "private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter.' 
29
The general rule with respect to most zoning regulations is that a
zoning regulation will be upheld as constitutional unless it has no
rational relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare. Due to the local nature of land planning and development,
this low standard of review is easily met by a municipality that passes an
ordinance pursuant to a commission's recommendations or a planning
initiative."a Ordinances adopted in an effort to stem the flow of traffic
into a municipality have been recognized as substantially related to the
health and safety of citizens."a General environmental concerns, such
as pollution, as well as enhancing quality of life by reducing noise,
traffic hazards, and litter are sufficient to meet the low constitutionality
standard.2 Thus, a municipality's making a plan based simply on wel-
fare concerns has a good chance of remaining in effect.33 Nevertheless,
state and local legislators have reserved and exercised their right to
27. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Hts. v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977).
28. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
29. Id. Justices Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun all expressed the views
of the opinion which announced the decision of the Court. Justice Stevens concurred,
stating that while the Euclid decision vastly diminished the rights of individual property
owners, it did not totally extinguish those rights. Moreover, broad zoning powers must
be exercised within constitutional limits.
30. But see City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432(1985) (mental retardation not a suspect class, but no rational basis to suppose group
home would pose a threat).
31. See County Bd. of Arlington County v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977).
32. Id.
33. See Jerold S. Kayden, Land-Use Regulations, Rationality, and Judicial
Review-The RSVP in the Nollan Invitation, 23 URB. LAW. 301 (1991).
SPRING 1997
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referendum, and have essentially added another, perhaps unnecessary,
step to the zoning enactment process.
II. Mandatory Referendum
The term "referendum" is defined as the power reserved to the people,
in some jurisdictions, to approve or reject at the polls an enactment of
a legislative body.34 The right of the electors of a municipality to
exercise this power exists by virtue of express provisions of the state
constitution.35 The power of referendum may also be established by
a charter provision adopted by a municipality and approved by the
legislature, or by municipal enactment.36
The constitutionality of referendum power was first challenged before
the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Eubank v. City of Richmond.37
In Eubank, the city council of Richmond passed an ordinance that
required the "Committee on Streets" to establish a "building line" 38
for a piece of property at the request of two-thirds of the abutting
property owners. The ordinance left no discretion to the "Committee
on Streets" as to whether the building line should be established at
all. Instead, their actions were dictated by two-thirds of the abutting
owners. 39
The Court held that the control of the use of the owner's property
by that owner's neighbors was a violation of the Due Process Clause
because it constituted an unreasonable exercise of police powers. 4 The
court stated,
It leaves no discretion in the committee on streets as to whether the street line shall
or shall not be established in a given case. The action of the committee is determined
by two-thirds of the property owners. In other words, part of the property owners
fronting on the block determine the extent of use that the owners shall make of
their lots, and against the restriction they are impotent. This we emphasize. One
set of owners determines not only the extent of use, but kind of use which another
set of owners may make of their property. In what way is the public safety,
convenience, or welfare served by conferring such power? The statute and ordinance,
while conferring the power on some property holders to virtually control and dispose
34. 42 AM. JUR. 2d, Initiative and Referendum § 1 (1969).
35. See David L. Callies, Nancy C. Neuffer & Carlito P. Caliboso, Ballet Box
Zoning: Initiative, Referendum and the Law, 39 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 53
(1991).
36. See Id.
37. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
38. A line past which no buildings could be erected.
39. Id. at 143.
40. Id. at 144.
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of the property rights of others, creates no standard by which the power thus given
is to be exercised.
4
1
The next case dealing with the constitutionality of mandatory referen-
dum was decided soon after the Supreme Court promulgated the general
constitutionality of zoning enactments in Euclid. The case of Washing-
ton v. Roberge42 reiterated a zoning ordinance's general presumption
of constitutionality, however, it also addressed a referendum issue
similar to Eubank. In Roberge, an owner of property wanted to construct
a home for the aged; however, there was an ordinance which permitted
the establishment of such a home only upon the consent of two-thirds of
the property owners within a certain distance of the proposed building.43
In deciding the case, the Court emphasized that zoning measures
must find their justification in the police power exerted in the interest
of the public and that legislatures must not, under the guise of the
police power, impose restrictions that are unnecessary and unreasonable
upon the private property or the pursuit of useful activities.' The Court
was particularly interested in the procedure that was in place when
deciding zoning measures and who had the authority to make a decision
that affected a property owner's rights. The Court found that the purpose
of the proposed building was in line with the plans of the zoning
regulation's plans,45 but questioned the city ordinance on the books
which required the surrounding landowner's consent. That delegation
of power, the Court ruled, was repugnant to the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. To that end, the attempted delegation
of power to the surrounding neighbors, through mandatory referendum,
was invalid and the permit to build the home was granted.46
After initially striking down the constitutionality of mandatory refer-
endum as applied to a zoning ordinance, the Court revisited this aspect
of zoning regulation in the case of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc.47 In Eastlake, a city charter provision required that proposed land
use be ratified by 55 percent of the votes cast.48 The plaintiff, a real
estate developer, acquired a parcel of land that was zoned "light indus-
trial." He applied to the city for a zoning change to permit construction
of a multi-family, high-rise apartment building and then attempted to
41. Id. at 143.
42. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
43. Id. at 118.
44. Id. at 120-121.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 122-23.
47. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
48. Id.
SPRING 1997
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invalidate the referendum provision as an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative powers. While the case was pending, the action was
submitted to referendum but was not approved.49 The Court of Common
Pleas and the court of appeals ultimately upheld the referendum provi-
sion; however, on appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed.5 ° The
Ohio Supreme Court concluded that "a popular referendum require-
ment, lacking standards to guide the decision of the voters, permitted
the police power to be exercised in a standardless, hence arbitrary and
capricious manner."51 After granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed, upholding the referendum requirement.52
In a different line of reasoning from Eubank and Roberge, the Court
held that a referendum, which it defined as direct political participation
by the people allowing for what amounts to a veto power over legislative
enactments, could not be characterized as a delegation of power.53
Because the power of referendum was specifically reserved to the
people under the Ohio Constitution, the people could directly deal with
matters that might otherwise be assigned to the legislature.-, The Court
distinguished cases in which the legislature delegated "approval"
power to regulatory agencies which were not "directly responsible to
the people." 55 The Court further stated that the referendum result could
itself be challenged as arbitrary and capricious, and consequently, the
mandate of a public referendum to approve a zoning ordinance was
deemed a constitutional exercise of power.56
In his dissent, Justice Stevens changed the focus of the analysis and
expressed concern for the property rights of an individual and whether
the mandatory referendum requirement was fundamentally fair.5
Because no challenge was made by either party that the individual
property owner's intended use ran afoul of the municipality's zoning
plan or was in contravention of the health and welfare of the general
public, the dissent focused on the procedures involved. Justice Powell
gave deference to the conclusion of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision
that the procedure represented an arbitrary and unreasonable way of
49. Id.
50. 324 N.E.2d 740 (Ohio 1975).
51. 426 U.S. at 671.
52. Id. at 672.
53. Id.
54. See also Rispo Invest. Co. v. City of Seven Hills, 629 N.E.2d 3 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1993).
55. Id. at 675.
56. Id. at 676.
57. Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 680.
HeinOnline  -- 29 Urb. Law. 285 1997
handling a local problem.58 He agreed with the logic of the Ohio Court
that a mandatory citywide referendum which applied to any zoning
change would, of necessity, submit a decision affecting one person's
use of his property to thousands of voters with no interest in the property
whatsoever. In the lower court's opinion, Ohio Supreme Court Justice
Stern had given the example that by such a provision, rezoning a corner
gasoline station on one end of town would require the approval of
thousands of voters, most of them living miles away, and few of them
with the slightest interest in the matter. 9 Justice Stevens stated that
although conceivably a small parcel, such as an eight acre development,
could be sufficient to arouse the legitimate interest of the entire commu-
nity, it was equally conceivable that most of the voters would be
uneducated and uninformed about a proposed zoning ordinance, thus
leading to a fundamentally unfair procedure that was arbitrary in
nature.60
Both the Court in Roberge and the dissent in Eastlake echo a similar
rationale for holding that mandatory referendum procedures regarding
zoning ordinances should be unconstitutional. In both cases, the
Supreme Court was concerned with the arbitrary nature of the general
electorate vote as being a necessary part of a zoning ordinance's fate.
Requiring such a step brings about two general concerns. First, as
Roberge discussed, is the individual property owner's right to use his
property for whatever purpose he desires and other property owners'
inability to arbitrarily prevent that use of land. Second, is the arbitrary
nature of the voting process and the effect that the general electorate's
inability to understand a zoning ordinance as requiring an arbitrary
determination of the validity of such ordinance.
Subsequent to Eastlake, state courts have addressed the constitution-
ality of mandatory referenda in various situations, with one of the focal
points being on whether the land use decision can be classified as a
"legislative" decision, as opposed to an "administrative" one. Since
only those classified as legislative decisions may be exposed to the
general electorate, a referendum may follow on a zoning decision only
if the decision is characterized as legislative, but not if characterized
as an administrative action. This is exemplified by Leonard v. City of
Bothell6 in which the Washington Supreme Court held that while the
enactment of a zoning ordinance was legislative (subject to referendum),
58. Id. at 686.
59. Id. at 690.
60. Id. at 694.
61. 557 P.2d 1306 (Wash. 1976).
THE URBAN LAWYER VOL. 29, No. 2 SPRING 1997
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an amendment to a zoning ordinance was administrative (not subject
to voter approval). Another avenue for avoiding an obligatory public
referendum is declaring that a "rezoning" is an adjudicative function
that gives with it guarantees of due process that will not be subject to
the general electorate.62 While various states agree with the assessment
of rezoning being a nonlegislative act, most state courts have determined
that both zoning and rezoning are legislative acts subject to voter
approval.63 In rationalizing this view, Justice Tobriner, writing for the
California Supreme Court in Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa
Mesa,64 stated that to make such a distinction between legislative act
and nonlegislative act would predicate determining a legislative action
on the basis of the size of property effected. 65 Tobriner concluded that
such a distinction would result in uncertain application of policy because
what was a small parcel in one municipality might be a large parcel
in another municipality.
These cases illustrate the difficulties of the referendum process,
especially with respect to zoning. Justice Tobriner is correct in positing
that differentiating between administrative actions, legislative actions,
and judicial actions causes its own bureaucratic problems; however,
declaring a zoning or rezoning action legislative so that a mandatory
referendum is warranted does not solve any of the bureaucratic problems
the referendum itself causes. State zoning acts already include within
them an adherence to constitutionality and mandate that an ordinance
be passed "in accordance with a comprehensive plan." 66 Adding the
additional tier of mandatory referendum is, at times, a superfluous and
self-defeating gesture as the general electorate tends not to have any
comprehensive plan in mind when voting on a particular issue.67
Several scholarly treatises have commented on the inefficiency of
direct electorate decision making in other areas of the law in both
the realm of initiative and of referendum.68 In the 1994 comment,
Interpretation of Initiatives by Reference to Similar Statutes: Canons
of Construction Do Not Adequately Measure Voter Intent,69 Stephen
62. See Mark W. Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Zoning Deci-
sionmaking, 65 N.D. L. REV. 161, 188-91 (1989).
63. For a comprehensive list of these cases, see Kublicki, supra note 9, at notes
194-95.
64. 620 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1980).
65. Id. at 523.
66. Kublicki, supra note 9 at 101.
67. Id.
68. An initiative is a petition begun by the electorate. A referendum follows an
ordinance already enacted.
69. 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 945 (1994).
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H. Sutro critiques California's initiative process. Sutro states that
although the initiative process "sought to further public discussion of
important issues.., it is unclear to what extent the initiative process has
succeeded in achieving these noble goals." 7" In reaching his assessment,
Sutro points to the overburdening of courts with "tremendous amounts
of litigation due to ambiguity in initiative language," and further over-
burdening due to constitutional challenges.71
Thomas Gais and Gerald Benjamin reach a similar conclusion regard-
ing the initiative process in potential constitutional reform. In Public
Discontent and the Decline ofDeliberation: A Dilemma in State Consti-
tutional Reform,"2 the authors conclude,
Voters' choices are sometimes affected by highly emotional, symbolic appeals
triggering general hostility toward bureaucrats and politicians. Moreover, voters are
frequently confused by the technical language of ballot propositions. Many voters
learn about initiatives only days before elections, often rely on just one source of
information, and rarely discuss the issues with other citizens. The fate of initiatives
also seem to be largely influenced by how much money is spent on the proposals,
particularly by their opponents.73
The authors further comment that "initiatives are not very representa-
tive," because the elections suffer from low turnout and that the issues
"are often decided by a minority of voters whose preferences frequently
differ from state citizens as a whole.' 7
4
In Direct Democracy: The Right of the People to Make Fools of
Themselves; The Use and Abuse of Initiative and Referendum, a Local
Government Perspective,"5 Daniel M. Warner chronicled the trials and
tribulations of the initiative and referendum process in Whatcom
County, Washington, from 1983 through 1991. Warner's observation
was that the initiative (or referendum) process accomplished little more
than disrupting legitimate governmental plans, enacting unconstitu-
tional ordinances, delaying solutions that might have been implemented
earlier in time, and costing the taxpayers expense because of govern-
ment work-hours dedicated to the complications associated with the
process (such as litigation)."6
With respect to zoning specifically, Warner detailed the referendum
challenge of Whatcom County directed at Washington State's "Growth
70. Id. at 945.
71. Id. at 947.
72. 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1291 (1995).
73. Id. at 1301-02.
74. Id. at 1302.
75. 19 SEATTLEU. L. REv. 47 (1995).
76. Id. at 75.
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Management Act' '-an Act passed to "encourage orderly growth and
development in certain counties in the state." In accordance with the
Act, Whatcom County, through a technical advisory committee and a
citizens' advisory group, began "the process of defining and, by ordi-
nance, limiting the use of, intrusion into, and exploitation of wetlands,
steep slopes, alluvial plains, and other critical areas within the
County." 77
In response to what had become what was known as the "Critical
Areas Ordinance," a rather radical coalition emerged with the intent
to derail any ordinance by causing disruptions of city council meetings
and emphasizing publicly that environmental regulations were actually
a denigration of individual land rights." After the Council adopted a
"Critical Areas Ordinance," it was submitted to referendum.79 After
a campaign that essentially misconstrued what the ordinance intended
to do, the referendum derailed attempts to protect areas in the county.8°
After the referendum vote had thwarted what had originally been an
Act by the State of Washington, the county challenged the referendum
process. First, the Western Washington Growth Management Hearings
Board declared the referendum illegal, and then the Washington
Supreme Court concurred.8 Warner points to the following rationale
for the court's decision:
First, the court found the "power to act under the [state] Growth Management Act
was delegated to the 'county legislative body,' " and is not, therefore, subject to
referendum. Second, the court found that the entire purpose of state-wide planning
would be jeopardized by allowing counties to effectively repeal state law through
referenda. Third, the court held that the ordinance was adopted to promote "public
health [and] safety," and such ordinances cannot, under the county charter, be
amended by referenda. Fourth, the court held that the process of adopting the
amended ordinance did not comport with state law under the Planning Enabling
Act, which requires a whole process of "commissions and planning agencies, and
further describes the procedural functions of each" before adoption of any land-
use planning law under the Act. 2
What the Washington Supreme Court points to is that the process
appeared to be constitutional as it was without the referendum, and
that the use of the referendum did little more than thwart what had
been appropriate legislation enacted via appropriate channels.
77. Id. at 70.
78. Id. at 70-73.
79. Id. at 73.
80. Id.
81. Whatcom County v. Brisbane, 884 P.2d 1326 (1994).
82. Warner, supra note 77, at 75-76 (quoting, in part, Whatcom County v. Bris-
bane).
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Finally, in a research project conducted in Ohio that examined the
Cuyahoga County election records from 1962 to 1982, Ronald H.
Rosenberg came to the conclusion that subjecting zoning changes to
mandatory referendum did not accomplish the goal of advancing com-
prehensive plans for a community as the passage or lack of passage
seemed based on arbitrariness.83 The study found that over the study
period, land-use referenda were successful 61 percent of the time, with
only 48 percent being passed that concerned single parcel rezoning.
84
Although the results did not reflect a picture of complete hostility to
all zoning changes, the author noted that most of the unsuccessful
referendum proposals would have been enacted into local law absent
the plebiscite requirement.85 The study indicated a high success rate
for zoning referendum following the Eastlake decision that could be
attributed either to a greater number of zoning referenda proposed to
the general electorate or a blind confirmation of decisions previously
made by city councils on matters of land-use policy.86 Analyzing all
of the data compiled, the author concluded that there was no clear
pattern regarding the success or the failure of the zoning ordinances.
Not surprisingly, one of the findings in his research was that the ballot
language employed for land-use referenda within the study area was
confusing and occasionally incomprehensible.87
Although a mandatory zoning referendum might be for the purpose
of encouraging an enlightened form of participatory democracy, an
interested voter's effectiveness is limited to the language on the ballot.
The result might very well be an arbitrary determination of whatever
issue is presented to the voter. Moreover, Rosenberg's study indicated
that voter turnout as a whole had been very low, leaving the fate of
the zoning ordinance up to a small percentage of eligible voters within
the jurisdiction.88 As the author of the survey concluded, the zoning
mechanism used by a variety of municipalities in Cuyahoga County
was conspicuously undemocratic. By requiring referendum, the ability
to establish community goals and to implement them through legislative
action is withdrawn from the popularly elected representatives. More
83. See supra note 8.
84. Id. at 428. Single parcel rezoning often deals with a variance that a business
might ask for.
85. Id. at 429-30.
86. Id. Due to the blind affirmation of proposed ordinances, the author of this
study questioned the effectiveness of mandatory referendum and the costs that such
a system placed on municipalities, due to the unnecessary delays and administrative
costs of having to subject a proposed land development ordinance to a vote.
87. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 432.
88. Id.
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importantly, the expertise of city planners and commissions became
subject to a layman's interpretation of incomprehensible language on
the ballot. The process of community planning and land use was merely
lengthened and became subject to the whimsical nature of the general
electorate.89 This is exactly the type of arbitrary behavior that Euclid,
Eubank, and Roberge sought to prevent by reviewing the criteria neces-
sary to have zoning ordinances in and of themselves comport with due
process principles.
III. Conclusion
The Supreme Court recognized the importance of a comprehensive
planning scheme when it decided Euclid, Eubank, and Roberge. In
requiring that an ordinance bear some substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare, the Court reaffirmed the need
to comprise long-range plans for land development. At the same time,
the Court properly placed those types of decisions in the hands of those
in the best position to make them-land planning experts. By passing
the power to enact zoning legislation to the general electorate, the
Eastlake Court has granted municipalities, and more importantly neigh-
boring property owners, the ability to decide the fate of zoning ordi-
nances. Subjecting a zoning ordinance to such a mandatory referendum
might well render the ultimate decision in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, with legislation
already geared towards enacting zoning in accordance with a constitu-
tional and comprehensive plan, the use of a referendum that would
potentially hinder the enactment of the comprehensive plan without an
informed electorate is an unnecessary step causing impediment to the
process that already has adequate constitutional safeguards.
89. Id. at 433.
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